Creation of Task Force 3-506th
Air Cavalry in II Corps
By Lieutenant Col. R. M. Elton "Spider", 3-506th Infantry
In early January of 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) assembled its widely scattered elements in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). This consolidation pulled the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry out of IICTZ and left the four provinces of Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong without any US force. COMUSMACV, decided to create a separate airborne-airmobile battalion task force, under the operational control of Commanding General, First Field Force Vietnam (IFFORCEV), as an economy of force measure for this area. The 3rd Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry) was chosen to become the nucleus of this task force and on 17 January, was moved to Phan Thiet. The force was to have a dual responsibility: short fuze airmobile deployment into the four provinces mentioned and rapid airborne assault any- where in RVN. Specifically, the missions of the task force were:
- to conduct all authorized forms of land, sea, and air warfare within its capabilities
- to organize and participate in combined operations with Free World Military Forces in the four provinces
- to assist Binh Thuan Province with their Rural Development Program, and
- to keep National Route #1 open and maintained from the III CTZ border to Phan Rang.
Optimum Configuration
The task force (TF) grew to slightly over 2,000 men, and was truly a commander's dream:
- 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry: 4 rifle companies
- 1 Combat Support Company 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery:
- 3 batteries, 6 ea 105mm howitzers F.S.C.C.
- 192d Assault Helicopter Company: 21 UHIH, 7 UHIB (gunship)
- Delta Battery, 2d Battalion, (AIRBORNE) 320th Artillery: 5 ea M102, 105mm howitzers
- Delta Company, 27th Engr Battalion (Cmbt): construction operations in area, Route 1
- Forward Support Area, 1st Log Command: furnished all classes of supply
- 1st Plat,
Co A, 69th Armor:
- 5 ea M 48A3 90mm gun tanks
- 3rd Plat, Co E (LRRP), 20th Infantry - 6 ea 5 man teams\with equipment
- Detachment.
43rd Medical Group:
- Clearing station, surgeons, 2 UHIH Medevac aircraft
- Detachment.
43rd Signal Battalion:
- provided VHF, RTT, SSB communications with IFFV
- Destroyer (DD) with Shore Fire Control Party
- Air LNO/Forward Air Controllers 2 each
- 51st
Military Intel Detachment:
- IPW teams, Radio Research Unit
- 1st Plat,
Battery A, 60th Artillery: 8 ea SP Twin 40mm
- 4 ea quad 50 cal guns
Operational Methods
The TF generally deployed in coordination with some Free World Forces. This coordination ranged from the use of an RF company as firebase security to an operation involving 2 ARVN Battalions, I ROKA Battalion, I Provisional "Mike" Battalion, and the TF. The combined command worked out areas of operation, fire sup- port coordination, a communication plan and logistic support for each force. The TF conducted their initial assault into a designated tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), either day or night, by helicopter, junk fleet, or on foot. Each rifle company was given an area of operations within the Battalion TAOR. They conducted cloverleaf search or reconnaissance in force operations during the day, and established from three to six ambushes at night. The companies achieved a good measure of security by constant movement and aggressive offensive operations. One of the basic concepts was to try to live as closely as possible like the enemy in his habitat, and then disrupt his activities in his own backyard. Helicopters were not flown into the company locations except during contact. Each man carried 3-4 days of supply in a rucksack, and the companies were resupplied according to a prearranged schedule.
The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established by the combat support company commander and was generally collocated with Battery D, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery on a hilltop in the mountains. Low ground was only used when there was no commanding terrain available. It was positioned for command and control, emergency resupply, and fire support. The communications was augmented so that the TF Cmdr could talk to HQ, IFFORCEV, in Nha Trang by telephone or radio. Security for the CP was generally shared by US and Vietnamese combined. The US element doubled as a thirty-minute airmobile reaction force to reinforce TF Contacts. The helicopters simply picked up the troops at the TOC and flew them to the area of contact. Once the reinforcing unit landed, the senior commander on the ground assumed operational control of all elements in the immediate area.
When emergency missions arose in distant portions of the four province areas where the TF was not operating, the Battalion XO, as dispatched within 24 hours with a sub-task force. These forces generally consisted of a small control party, a command and control helicopter, necessary troop and gun helicopters, one US rifle company and one US artillery battery. They operated in conjunction with ARVN and RF units. This rapid shifting of combat power often caught VC elements by surprise. One such operation hit elements of the 840 MF Battalion as they were getting ready to attack the district headquarters of Hoa Da in Binh Thuan Province. The task force disrupted the VC attack before it could get rolling, killed thirty-four and captured two. The obvious strain on supply and communications, which these "split" operations created was successfully relieved by ingenious planning and aggressive supervision of the staff officers of the TF.
All ground elements of the TF used Kit Carson Scouts. Each rifle company was given four to use as a team or separately. The ex-VC proved invaluable in the search, and spotted trail and jungle indications quickly. Many VC surprises were foiled by the plucky little scout. The TF S2 deployed a minimum of five LRRP teams into areas of the battalion Area of Operation that were not covered by the rifle companies. He reorganized the battalion reconnaissance platoon into five teams of six men each for this purpose. They worked with the 3rd platoon, 20th Infantry (LRRP-IFFORCEV) to give the TF a total of ten teams. In one twelve-day operation, forty-two separate LRRP insertions resulted in nineteen contacts of which, twelve were reinforced with an airmobile force. The small teams completely confused the enemy as to the TF intentions and dispositions and furnished outstanding hard intelligence. A captured courier's document indicated that HQ military Region 6, had put up a reward of 5,000 piasters for the capture of one team, dead or alive. In all operations, not a single member was captured; and those few who were killed, were evacuated.
To support these "free-wheeling" operations, the TF S4 had an enormous task. He established a rear base/forward supply point at a convenient airfield to provide engineer and medical support, helicopter revetments and a refuel and rearm point, Class I and V, and minimum administrative facilities. He worked in close coordination with the S1, S5, Surgeon, and Engineer Company Cmdr. The TF S5 combined the actions of the Sector r S5, Medcap, Psychological Operations Team, Viet. Information Service, Armed Propaganda Teams, and at times, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to target onto specific towns or hamlet complexes outside the influence of the RD Cadre. These activities complemented adjacent tactical operations, brought GVN influence back into the area, collected information, and helped to root out local VC infrastructure. One operation resulted in the capture of forty-one members of local VC infrastructure.
These methods of operation exploited the imagination and aggressiveness of the young airborne company commanders and staff officers. In the small combined operations, a great amount of professionalism was required of the young leaders. One such operation involved a US rifle company of two platoons, a section of 4.2 in mortars, a tank platoon, an engineer squad, an RF company and selected Kit Carson Scouts. The young commander's mission was to destroy tunnel and bunker complexes in the hamlet areas in a 10 x 6 km area north of Phan Thiet. At night, he was to establish ambushes. Before daybreak of the 3rd day, he made contact. In four hours time he closed in upon the enemy, utilized naval gunfire to seal escape routes, simultaneously coordinated two TAC air strikes, maneuvered the RF Company with his company and the tanks, and completely destroyed the CI company of the 482nd LF VC Battalion. The action accounted for forty-three VC killed, to include the company commander, and one PW. US Casualties amounted to only one slightly WIA. In 4 ½ months, the 'Task Force touched down at their base only twice, for two days each. However, the morale of each man was extremely high. They were busy doing an important job, and they knew it. When they staggered out of the jungle for R&R or CONUS rotation, they were tired, but proud.
Two visible benefits of these operations improved ARVN offensive operations in that area; open camaraderie developed between US and Vietnamese at all levels. Prior to the formation of the TF, the ARVN and RF units did not conduct many operations in the area. By 1 June, all RF units were conducting operations at least five days a week to include two night operations per unit. The ARVN units were getting into the habit of staying in the Area of Operation for extended operations. The US company commanders reported and wrote citations for numerous acts of individual valor in which ARVN, Montagnard and Kit Carson Scouts saved US lives or performed heroically. The more the units worked together, the more effective the entire effort became. By 1 July 1968, the TF had worked in harmony with all the major Vietnamese Units in the four provinces and had received accolades from the Commanding General, II Corps, General Vinh Loc, and the ARVN 23rd Division Commander, Gen Ahn. COMUSMACV personally credited the TF and its combined operations for neutralizing the activities of the enemy elements in the four provinces, disrupting Headquarters, MR-6, and literally destroying the 842nd VC LF Battalion. The economy-of-force methods more than successfully accomplished the mission. They established a pattern which was being expanded in II CTZ in 1969 and throughout the reminder of the war.